Innovating Victory: Naval Technology in Three Wars

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New technologies bring new vulnerabilities. Radar and Active sonar emit sound waves that can detect and be detected by the enemy. Computer based systems whilst bringing efficiencies in operations, also expose users to increasing levels of vulnerability. Expectations do not determine best use. Historically, the expectations that attend new technologies have been unrealistic, and uses the development of submarines and aircraft as examples – their capabilities took a long time to mature.

The authors set themselves a bold purpose, to examine six technologies (two weapons, two tools, and two platforms), chart their influence on naval warfare, and provide “new perspectives and insights” into how technological innovation develops and progresses. The authors recognize this is a ‘vast subject, ‘ but they have done a very effective job at examining the six technologies and their use in war. I believe this is one of the great strengths of the book, the emphasis on actual use, because–as the authors correctly point out–theories about the potential of technology must regularly be revised once a new technology collides with the reality of its utility.”–Trent Hone, author, Learning War: The Evolution of Fighting Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1898-1945 Innovating Victory: Naval Technology in Three Wars studies how the world’s navies incorporated new technologies into their ships, their practices, and their doctrine. It does this by examining six core technologies fundamental to twentieth-century naval warfare including new platforms (submarines and aircraft), new weapons (torpedoes and mines), and new tools (radar and radio). Each chapter considers the state of a subject technology when it was first used in war and what navies expected of it. It then looks at the way navies discovered and developed the technology’s best use, in many cases overcoming disappointed expectations. It considers how a new technology threatened its opponents, not to mention its users, and how those threats were managed. Innovating Victory shows that the use of technology is more than introducing and mastering a new weapon or system. Differences in national resources, force mixtures, priorities, perceptions, and missions forced nations to approach the problems presented by new technologies in different ways. Navies that specialized in specific technologies often held advantages over enemies in some areas but found themselves disadvantaged in others. Vincent P. O’Hara and Leonard Heinz present new perspectives and explore the process of technological introduction and innovation in a way that is relevant to today’s navies, which face challenges and questions even greater than those of 1904, 1914, and 1939. Innovating Victory: Naval Technology in Three Wars by Vincent P. O’Hara – eBook Details Cover: Innovating Victory: Naval Technology in Three Wars by Vincent P. Ohara and Leonard R. Heinz INNOVATING VICTORY consider the state of the technology when it was first used in war and how different navies expected to use it

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There’s an old saying that necessity is the mother of invention. That sentiment was definitely the case during World War II, a massive global conflict that presented the United States with a variety of tactical and logistical challenges. At every turn Americans seemed to need more of everything—more supplies, bigger bombs, faster airplanes, better medical treatments, and more precise communications. In response, scientists, technicians, and inventors supplied a steady stream of new products that helped make victory possible. Many of these innovations transformed the very nature of warfare for future generations and also had a significant impact on the lives of civilians as well. Given the limitations of the cases presented here, the authors did a commendable job of creating an accessible and readable volume that points out some potential pitfalls to avoid and techniques for developing technological advantage in wartime. The target audience is not the Department of Defense Acquisition Professional or the cadre of doctrine writers who will not be surprised by any of the book’s findings. Military enthusiasts, whether professional or amateur, however, will enjoy the book and should add it to their military history library. Mines and torpedoes. These weapons are nineteenth-century technologies of tremendous impact. Mines gave navies a way to shape geography, while torpedoes allowed the smallest platforms to defeat the largest.

PDF / EPUB File Name: Innovating_Victory_-_Vincent_P_OHara.pdf, Innovating_Victory_-_Vincent_P_OHara.epub A goal of this book was to set forth the principles that govern the successful development, introduction and use of naval technology. It concludes in this context that: Innovating Victory – Naval Technology in Three Wars. By Vincent P. O’Hara and Leonard R. Heinz. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 2022. Vincent P. O’Hara is an independent naval historian and the author of thirteen works, including Six Victories: North Africa, Malta, and the Mediterranean Convoy War, November 1941-March 1942 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2019) and with Leonard R. Heinz, Clash of Fleets: Naval Battles of the Great War, 1914-18 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2017). He holds a history degree from the University of California, Berkeley. Leonard R. Heinz worked for many years as a financial services lawyer while maintaining an active interest in military and naval history. He has written articles and designed wargames on naval topics and earned a history degree from the University of Pennsylvania.Within each of these chapters, they do a commendable job of producing a pleasingly readable condensed history that compares development success and failure across several nations including the United States, United Kingdom, Russia (and the USSR), Italy, France, Germany, Japan, and the Ottoman Empire, although not all of them in each case. Submarines and aircraft. These platforms allowed navies to operate in new environments below and above the surface of the sea, confounding existing weapons and tactics and expanding the scope of naval warfare.

anxieties regarding possible conflict with China.” —RADM Michael McDevitt, USN (Ret.), author of China as a Twenty-First-Century Naval Power “In our current era of artificial intelligence/machine learning, Vincent P. O’Hara is the author or co-author of more than 10 books, mainly on topics of World War I and II naval warfare. In this latest book, Innovating Victory: Naval Technology in Three Wars, O’Hara has teamed up with Leonard Heinz, an experienced designer of wargames and simulations with emphasis on tactical naval problems. The authors use their expertise to explore six case studies that analyze technological developments in the twentieth century. Needs influence use. Different navies use identical technologies differently. The difference between Allied and German development of radar is a prime example of this. Obviously, radio, radar, and aircraft are not technological developments exclusive to naval warfare so the authors found it necessary to discuss the development of these key innovations in broader terms that included the development of land-based systems. Those cases readily showed the complications that arose from politics, interservice rivalry, national competition, and policy decisions—particularly on the priority of capital investment. These human factors all contributed equally, or more so, than the science and engineering did in developing these technologies into effective weapon systems.

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Victory Innovations is a leading provider of cordless electrostatic spraying equipment for disinfecting surfaces. Victory Innovations is transforming the way businesses, transportation systems, hospitals and schools are cleaning and santizing using electrostatic technology. The chemical-agnostic product enables users to sanitize any surface area with the convenience of cordless portability, faster application time and reduced chemical usage. Founded in 2014, Victory has sales in over 40 countries. For more information, please visit www.victorycomplete.com. Victory’s tactical function as a capital ship was to maneuver in formation with her fellow capital ships to a position from which she could bombard enemy ships with her broadside of cannons. The tactical function of the dreadnought battleships that fought the Battle of Jutland, 111 years after Victory’s triumph at Trafalgar, was essentially the same. So too was the tactical goal of the commanding admirals: to concentrate their firepower through maneuver while preventing their opponents from doing the same. Naval professionals throughout the long decades of peace leading up to 1914 expended great effort trying to keep pace with the tactical implications of rapidly changing capital ship technology. Line-abreast formations were tried and discarded; ramming tactics went in and out of fashion; torpedoes and speed were heralded (by some) as revolutionary. Still, by 1914 fleets of gun-armed capital ships dominated naval thinking, much as the ship of the line had more than a century before. In terms of formations, objectives, and major weapons, John Jellicoe and Reinhard Scheer, the admirals at Jutland, essentially fought the same way that Horatio Nelson and Pierre Villeneuve fought Trafalgar. All sought to concentrate the power of their big guns. Jellicoe accomplished this by crossing in front of the German line and pounding its leading ships, while Nelson split the Franco-Spanish line and defeated it in detail, but both men had the same goal. The technical innovations in the capital ships of 1914 compared to those of 1805 were enormous, but the tactical goal was still to concentrate gun power more effectively than the foe. Clearly, synergy is involved, and all six of these technologies were deeply intertwined by 1945. Case studies will show how this synergy affected actual combat. The narrative will focus on the technologies of the first three waves. Fourth-wave technologies—that is, technologies invented or developed since the end of World War II—will be treated very lightly as they remain largely untested in peer-to-peer combat. It is not our intention to judge how such technologies might fare in a future war; instead, the purpose of this book is to consider basic principles.

By 1914, with combat governed by caution, the capital ship’s strategic function had come to dominate its tactical function. Basically, because cost had escalated to the point where relatively few nations could afford to construct capital ships in any quantity, their primary function became to exist rather than to fight. Their very existence in superior numbers was enough to guarantee sea control. There was no point in fighting. This strategic aspect of the dreadnought revolution, as expressed in World War I, caught navies by surprise when it was recognized at all. Each chapter begins with an account of the technology’s early development, including its first adoption by navies and initial expectations surrounding it. Next, the chapter discusses the discovery phase. For mines, torpedoes, and radio, this is the Russo-Japanese War; for submarines and aircraft, World War I; and for radar, World War II. Once the discovery phase is covered, the chapter focuses on evolution. In most cases this occurred after the war in which discovery took place, although submarines passed through both a discovery phase and an evolution phase during World War I, and radar did the same in World War II. After evolution, the exploitation of the fully developed technology is examined. For five of the technologies, the exploitation phase occurred in World War II; radio was sufficiently developed by 1914 to be exploited in both wars. Countermeasures and further evolution are discussed where relevant. The section describing the exploitation of the technology in World War II is followed by a summary of postwar developments and a brief review of the technology’s current state. Each chapter concludes with lessons to be learned. Description: Annapolis, Maryland : Naval Institute Press, [2022] | Includes bibliographical references and index. Demand for Victory’s cordless electrostatic sprayers has grown significantly since the company’s founding in 2014, and recently saw a dramatic increase as a result of COVID-19. Carlyle’s investment will accelerate Victory’s growth trajectory, including its planned expansion in key global markets in Asia, Europe, Latin America and Africa.Schools and hospitals were among the first to adopt Victory’s technology, followed by an increasing number of other businesses and industries, from airlines and hotels to gyms and professional sports. valuable.” —Norman Friedman, author of U.S. Submarines Through 1945: An Illustrated Design History “O'Hara and Heinz are to be congratulated on a fine book about discuss how navies developed doctrine and incorporated ancillary technologies to improve the core technology’s effectiveness.