The Panzers of Prokhorovka: The Myth of Hitler’s Greatest Armoured Defeat

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Consequently, the reviewer would recommend The Panzers of Prokhorovka for serious students of the Eastern Front, and those with a detailed understanding of armoured warfare, and in particular the German SS Panzer capability in World War II.

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Töppel, Roman (2021). "The Battle of Prokhorovka: Facts Against Fables". The Journal of Slavic Military Studies. 34 (2): 251–270. doi: 10.1080/13518046.2021.1990559. The book is also a masterclass in source analysis. In other words, the examination of a document not only for what it says, but for its own history. Who produced it? And for what purpose? Wheatley shows that hard work and diligence with a source – questioning whether it may be biased or simply false – is so vital to good history. There is a brilliant lesson here for aspiring academics. The actual number was 978 tanks in total — 306 German and 672 Soviet, according to Zamulin. As many as 400 Soviet and 80 German tanks were destroyed. This is a widely accepted view, of course, but to my mind The Panzers of Prokhorovka does not provide enough context to bridge the gap between the minuscule numbers of tanks lost at a tactical level in one battle and the vast array of destruction that epitomised the wider Eastern Front.Despite the huge number of tanks involved, Wheatley estimates the battlefront to have been no more than 3km (2 miles), so that, as he comments, ‘the location of one of the most famous battles of the Second World War was able to be photographed by the Luftwaffe in a single shot.’ The USSR went on to inflict a major defeat on Germany during the Moscow counter-offensive during the winter of 1941–1942, closing the door on the Germans ending the war on the terms Hitler set out. The later Battle of Stalingrad in 1942–1943 ended the possibility of German victory completely. Glantz, David (December 1991). From the Don to the Dnepr: Soviet Offensive Operations, December 1942 – August 1943. London: Taylor & Francis (Frank Cass). ISBN 978-0-7146-3350-3. Archival data of the II SS-Panzer Corps shows that the corps had 294 operable tanks and assault guns on the evening of 11 July, and 251 on the evening of 13 July. [77] Allowing for the possibility that some repaired tanks were returned to service on 13 July, these numbers indicate that at least 43 tanks and assault guns became inoperable during this period, which includes all ten Tigers belonging to Totenkopf and one belonging to Leibstandarte. [191] An estimated total of 60–80 tanks and assault guns of the II SS-Panzer Corps were damaged or destroyed in combat on 12 July. [192] [193] By the end of 16 July, the II SS-Panzer Corps had 292 serviceable tanks and assault guns, almost the same number it had at the beginning of the battle on 12 July. [194] On 12 July, Schlachtgeschwader 1 of the 8th Air Corps reported 11 aircraft damaged, all by Soviet anti-aircraft artillery, of which 6 were total write-offs. [6] Soviet [ edit ] Destroyed Soviet T-34, 1943

The Panzers of Prokhorovka : Benjamin William Wheatley The Panzers of Prokhorovka : Benjamin William Wheatley

The Battle of Prokhorovka has attained an almost holy status in Russian narratives of the war, celebrated not only as a victory but as a monumental and decisive engagement. In this book and the underlying research Ben Wheatley provides wholly persuasive empirical evidence that the familiar story of the battle is wrong. His findings speak for themselves and his clear, calm prose and evident respect for the Red Army serve only to make them more compelling. Prokhorovka was certainly an important clash and one of the largest tank battles ever, but it might be time to retire its description as the biggest — a claim which has been seriously questioned in recent years by historians with access to Soviet archives opened since the end of the Cold War.That narrative has been disputed by the historian Steven Newton, who dedicated a section of his 2002 publication about Operation Citadel to refuting it. [216] Using first-hand accounts of German officers who executed Operation Citadel and scrutinising Glantz's and House's sources, Newton contended that the plan for the 4th Panzer Army to swing from the Oboyan direction to Prokhorovka was decided as early as May 1943, well before Operation Citadel had commenced, as German planners of Army Group South had always expected an encounter between the 4th Panzer Army and Soviet reserves that would arrive at the Psel River and Prokhorovka. [216] Other historians have corroborated those conclusions. [217] Newton also asserts that has always been the accepted narrative in postwar literature. [218] Surprise factor [ edit ]

The Panzers of Prokhorovka: The myth of Hitler’s greatest

A remarkable new history of the largest tank battle of the Second World War and key moment in the 1943 Kursk campaign. This is fundamental reading for anyone wanting to understand operations on the Eastern Front, it will become a template for undertaking battlefield history.Newton, Steven (2002). Kursk: The German View: Eyewitness Reports of Operation Citadel by the German Commanders. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press. ISBN 0-306-81150-2. Molony, C. J. C.; Flynn, F. C.; Davies, H. L. & Gleave, T. P. (2004) [1973]. Butler, Sir James (ed.). The Mediterranean and Middle East. History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series. Vol.V: The Campaign in Sicily 1943 and The Campaign in Italy 3rd September 1943 to 31st March 1944. London: Naval & Military Press. ISBN 1-84574-069-6. Maps of the Battle of Prokhorovka, July 1943". Archived from the original on 5 January 2014 . Retrieved 17 July 2015. Frieser, Karl-Heinz (2017). The Eastern Front 1943–1944: The War in the East and on the Neighbouring Fronts. ISBN 978-0-19-103514-2. {{ cite book}}: |work= ignored ( help)

Full article: Citadel, Prokhorovka and Kharkov: The Armoured

Then everything changed, for the Soviet commanders had launched this vast number of tanks downhill towards German positions, forgetting that across the hill lay an anti-tank ditch, dug previously by their own forces.

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Losses for 12 July are difficult to establish for either combatant. Tank losses attributed to the German side vary, [184] in part due to the Wehrmacht 's methodology for counting and reporting equipment losses. Only equipment that could not be repaired or that had to be abandoned were counted as losses, but damaged equipment that could be recovered and repaired were simply listed as such. [185] [186] Likewise, reliable figures for tank and personnel casualties for the Red Army in the Battle of Prokhorovka are difficult to establish. [187] German [ edit ] If ever there was a time for a sober, authoritative dissection of the myths the Soviets fashioned from the Eastern Front, it is now.' - Oliver Moody, Berlin Correspondent for The Times German success can be explained by two factors: an astonishing error made by Russian commanders, and the consequent opportunity for their German counterparts to display the superiority of their new tanks and their firepower. The Soviet tank charge